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This paper uses a framework of player virtues to perform a 
theoretical exploration of what is required to make a game 
good. The choice of player virtues is based upon the view 
that games can be seen as implements, and that these are 
good if they support an intended use, and the intended use 
of games is to support people to be good players. A 
collection of gameplay design patterns, identified through 
their relation to the virtues, is presented to provide specific 
starting points for considering design options for this type 
of good games. 24 patterns are identified supporting the 
virtues, including RISK/REWARD, DYNAMIC ALLIANCES, 
GAME MASTERS, and PLAYER DECIDED RESULTS, as are 7 
countering three or more virtues, including ANALYSIS 
PARALYSIS, EARLY ELIMINATION, and GRINDING. The 
paper concludes by identifying limitations of the approach 
as well as by showing how it can be applied using other 
views of what are preferable features in games. 
Keywords 
Gameplay design, gameplay design patterns, player virtue 
ethics. 
INTRODUCTION 
What makes a game good? This question is of course very 
difficult to answer since it depends both on the opinions of 
both those that play the games, the gamers, and those that 
create the games, the game designers. However, it is also 
the most important issue for both groups and thus cannot 
be ignored simply because it is difficult. If this question 
could be approached in a neutral fashion, that is, one not 
based upon preferences of gameplay styles, it could not 
only provide an understanding of games in general but also 
offer a general starting point for new designs.  
This paper examines this question within the limiting scope 
of only considering gameplay. It makes use of gameplay 
design patterns [5], interrelated descriptions of commonly 
reoccurring gameplay parts of a game design, to illustrate 
specific gameplay mechanics. This not only to be able to 
more precisely describe them, but also to support designers 
since the patterns have been developed as design tools. 
DEFINITIONS OF GAMES 
One starting point for exploring what constitutes a good 
game might be to see what is required for something to be a 
game at all. Many definitions or collections of required 
characteristics for games have been presented; some seeing 
them as activities [1,7,9,13,27] while others see them as 
systems [10,15], or a combination  [1,25].  
All but two of these definitions ([9,27]) mention rules or 
something similar (i.e. limiting context [1], closed formal 
system [7], and voluntary control systems [1]). Also 
common is a stress on the importance of goals, using 
phrases such as “achieve their objectives” [1], “overcome 
unnecessary obstacles” [27], “in the pursuit of a goal” [9], 
and “influence the outcome” [15]. However, as several 
examples above show, the strive towards goals is also seen 
as being voluntary and this is stressed in other definitions 
as well, e.g. “a free activity” [13].  
Other definitions express similar views but stress 
confrontation, e.g. “Conflict (obstacles that challenge the 
goal pursuit)” [10], “contest between powers” [1], and 
“engage in an artificial conflict” [25]. Even if confrontation 
and aggression are parts of game definitions, several also 
stress the sheltering from adverse effects, e.g. “Safety 
(psychological experience of danger, without the physical 
realization thereof)” [10], and “consequences of the activity 
are optional and negotiable” [15]. Some go a step further, 
seeing game as something “consciously outside ‘ordinary’ 
life” [13] or “Separate in time and space” [7]. 
The absence, or near absence, of any of the characteristics 
makes it possible in a way to state that a game is bad 
simply because it is bad at being a game. This has for 
example been done in reference to Sid Meier’s statement, 
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that “a game is a series of interesting choices” to make the 
point that a good game have a range of possible actions that 
all are worth considering [24, p. 38]. However, this 
reasoning misses the point that it is not enough to know 
what characteristics should be present, one also needs to 
know how to make them present and in what form. 
The MDA framework [19] lists several different types of 
fun that games can provide, which can be seen as 
descriptions of what makes good games, and could 
therefore be seen as a better starting point that game 
definitions. However, it does not give detailed design 
guidelines beyond the model that gameplay mechanics give 
rise to dynamics which in turn can express the aesthetic 
intentions of a design. There are several other projects to 
make design knowledge about gameplay explicit. The 
game ontology project [29] uses prototype and grounded 
theory to create a hierarchical structure of game concepts 
from the players’ perspective, but does not specifically 
look at gameplay. In contrast, gameplay design patterns [5] 
look exclusively at gameplay and are organized in a web of 
relations. However, none of them makes explicit normative 
statements of how games should be constructed nor do they 
directly link to any of the definitions. The 400 rules project 
[12] provides normative statements but no hierarchy of 
importance (besides that some rules trump others), have 8 
years after being launched only one sentence sketches of 
112 rules, and are guidelines to how designers should think 
rather than descriptions of what makes games good. 
Given that finding a basis for what constitutes a good game 
was unsuccessful when looking at game definitions and 
game design tools, another starting point is needed. Game 
phenomena can be studied from three different 
perspectives, that of games, gamers, or gaming [4], or 
combinations of these. If looking directly at games does not 
reveal a viable approach to what makes them good, 
approaching the issue from one of the other perspectives 
may be more fruitful. Instead of trying to find a basis for 
good games one could instead look for what constitutes 
good players, and then hope to find a way to correlate this 
back to games. 
GOOD PLAYERS 
Starting in Aristotelian ethics, Sicart [26] argues that it is 
possible to judge people as good players from an ethical 
perspective by the use of virtues. Players have a virtue if 
they maintain the mean state between lacking the virtue 
completely and attributing excessive importance to it. One, 
classical, example would be that of bravery where one 
lacking the virtue is a coward and one having too much 
bravery being a daredevil or suicidal. It should be stressed 
that Sicart’s view is about how good people are as players, 
i.e. as agents interacting with or within a game, and not in 
relation to other activities or society in general. Through 
converting Bartle’s four categories of player types [2] and 
incorporating notions of game balance and sport ethics, 
Sicart finds six virtues for players, namely: 
• Sense of Achievement 
• Explorative Curiosity 
• Socializing Nature 
• Balanced Aggression 
• Care for Game Balance 
• Sportsmanship 
The first virtue, Sense of Achievement, is closely tied to the 
struggle towards goals stressed in several of the definitions 
of games mentioned above. To have this virtue, players 
should “compete fairly against the challenges of the game 
and against other players” [26, p. 95]. This should however 
be done with moderation since the ultimate goal should not 
be winning the game but “enjoying the game, alone or with 
others” [26, p. 95]. 
Explorative Curiosity has two aspects to it according to 
Sicart. The first, which can be seen as a prerequisite for the 
second, relates to the sheltering from consequences in 
games and the voluntary nature of the activities. Players 
should acknowledge this, “their belonging to that 
experience, their being as players, and the relatively safe 
nature of these environments” [26, p. 95]. By doing so they 
can be secure in “[e]xploring the game system and the 
possibilities of interaction” [26, p. 95]. 
Sicart describes the third virtue, Socializing Nature, as 
requiring players to “participate in a player community” 
[26, page 96] and “acknowledge that this community is a 
part of a game experience” [26, p. 96]. Support for this 
virtue is not so directly found in the definitions of games. 
Only one of them makes explicit reference to the social 
nature of games (“[promoting] the formation of social 
groupings” [13]) but many can be said to implicitly contain 
this since they describe interaction between players. One 
reason that some ([10,15,27]) do not mention it may be that 
they want to include single-player games. However, these 
games can also encourage social interaction since players 
can share experiences after the actual game event and 
discuss strategies and goals before. Sicart’s stance supports 
this view, adding that players that have this virtue should 
recognize “that it is the game, or the shared event of being 
a player, that makes the community exist” [26, p. 96]. 
Support for the virtue of Balanced Aggression is easily 
found in the presence of confrontation but also in the safety 
in games. Speaking metaphorically, Sicart states that 
players “may have the right to attack and kill other players, 
but that gameplay should be balanced, regulated, properly 
rewarded, and be interesting from a gameplay perspective” 
[26, pp. 96-97]. 
The basis for the penultimate virtue, Care for Game 
Balance, is the observation that game balance, which firstly 
can be seen as a pure consequence of gameplay design, 
also relies on the players. The balance in most games can 
be disrupted by players ganging up or exploiting 
knowledge of other players’ skills (or lack of skills) when 
choosing what game to play, and how to play it. Therefore, 
Sicart makes it part of the virtue to not do so, stating that  
“players ought to preserve the game balance, thereby 
making it a fair game for all the parties involved” [26, pp. 
96-97] but also “the preservation of a successful game 
experience for all players and agents involved in the game” 
[26, pp. 96-97].  
Sicart adds the sixth virtue from research on the ethics in 
sports, seeing sports and games as operational synonyms. 
Borrowing directly from that field of research, he sees the 
virtue as “a mean between an excessive seriousness, which 
misunderstands the importance of the spirit of play, and an 
excessive sense of playfulness, which may be called 
frivolity and which misunderstand the importance of 
victory and achievement when play is competitive” 
(Quoted in [26, p. 98]). 
Most of the virtues Sicart describes mention other players 
and how one should behave towards them. However, some 
also mention “agents” and “the game” as entities to relate 
to. Given this, and the fact that computers can in many 
cases take on the role of other players, in the following the 
virtues will be seen as applying to all entities that can 
interact within the system and are perceived as having 
goals. This is in line with the views of actor-network-
theory [18], and similar views have been expressed in game 
research [28]. Using the terminology of Daniel Dennett, the 
relations described by the virtues should be maintained 
towards all entities to which a player takes an intentional 
stance [11].  
A WORKING DEFINITION OF A GOOD GAME 
Armed with this view of good players, we can now return 
to games and what can make one game good and another 
bad.  
From a designer’s perspective a game is an artifact created 
by that designer (and others). Taking a functional approach 
to design, one could then state that a game is a good artifact 
if it supports the intended functionality of that type of 
artifact well. This matches one of Monö’s five views of 
useful things, that of an implement [21 , p. 17], and also the 
view in user-centered design on addressing the users’ needs 
and desires [22]. For games, one can argue that the 
function is to support the activity of gaming [4], but this 
begs the question of what constitutes good gaming.  
Since Sicart’s use of Aristotelian ethics implies practical 
wisdom and relates to action [26, p. 100], his description of 
good players can be rephrased as describing how people 
should behave to play in a good manner (not being the 
same as playing well). Although gaming was introduced to 
differentiate between goal-based activities in games from 
other activities also supported by games, Sicart’s use of the 
word playing matches this meaning and can thereby be 
seen as synonyms. Thus, Sicart’s idea of good players can 
be seen as another way of describing good gaming, and 
thereby also the intended goal of gameplay design. In other 
words:  
A good game is one that encourages 
people to be good players. 
Given this view of what constitutes good games, it 
becomes relevant to consider earlier connections between 
gameplay design and ethics. Consalvo, for instance 
observes that players judge games as good or bad 
depending on their entertainment value while politicians 
and interest groups judge them in relation to how they 
portray other phenomena [8]. Since the former of these 
opinions is based on taste, which is known to differ, and 
the latter relates to theme more than gameplay, they do not 
support the exploration of what makes games good from a 
gameplay perspective. Zagal introduces the concept of 
ethically notable games to discuss the possible relation 
between moral dilemmas and gameplay, classify games 
into the category if they “provide opportunities for 
encouraging ethical reasoning and reflection” [30]. By 
analyzing three games, he finds five ways to make games 
ethically notable: making players personally invested in 
gameplay decisions; requiring them to learn and follow 
ethical systems; testing their understanding of ethical 
systems by dilemmas; creating moral tension between 
gameplay reward structures and the diegetically presented 
character motivation; and creating moral tension between 
the players’ goals on one hand and those presented by the 
gameplay and diegesis on the other hand. Although Zagal 
discusses ethics, he does so from the perspective of which 
ways games can pose moral dilemmas to players. Rather 
than looking at what makes a game good or bad he 
provides a design tool for raising ethical issues through 
gameplay.   
Viewing good games as those that encourage people to be 
good players provides a goal for design but not the means 
of reaching that goal. Design tools are concepts, methods, 
and theories that can help designers reaching their goals, 
either by allowing the mapping and testing of possible 
alternatives, or by helping to provide intermittent goals. 
Several such design tools were mentioned in relation to 
definitions of games (i.e. [5,12,19,29]), but of these only 
gameplay design patterns describe gameplay concepts and 
offer the possibility of charting intermittent goals through 
series of related patterns1. Even if this makes patterns a 
useable design tool in this context, it does not explain how 
gameplay design patterns can be connected to Sicart’s 
model of virtuous players, and what patterns are most 
relevant. Exploring this could however be done in a rather 
direct way: going through all patterns and noting which 
patterns relate to which player virtues, and then see what 
                                                          
1 The entities within the Game Ontology Project [29] only 
provides one type of relation, parent-child, and does not 
clearly differentiate between gameplay aspects and other 
aspects. The 400 project [12] has only the “negative” 
relation of rules trumping each other, and does not 
describe concrete design suggestions.   
clusters or categories of patterns emerge. Gameplay design 
patterns are indicated in the paper through the use of small 
caps, e.g. REPLAYABILITY. 
A VIRTUOUS PATTERN EXAMINATION 
The initial collection of gameplay design patterns [5] 
consisted of slightly less than 300 patterns, and has since 
been expanded to over 500 from specific explorations of 
the design spaces of pervasive games [23], NPCs [16,17], 
Dialogues [6], and player Camaraderie [3]. The patterns in 
this expanded collection were first scanned for their initial 
relevance to the six virtues; for those related to a virtue it 
was noted if they either pulled towards the mean defined by 
that virtue or pulled towards an extreme. The goal of this 
scan was not to provide a complete mapping of the 
relations but to get a sense of the structure. After going 
through all the patterns in relation to the virtues some basic 
observations could be made.  
First, many patterns could either pull towards the mean or 
an extreme depending on how strongly, or how often, it 
was present. For these cases the typical use as determined 
by the author’s knowledge of games was chosen. For 
example, BLUFFING and ROLEPLAYING may be seen as 
portraying oneself as something one is not, but this in itself 
is a form of social activity which can be recognized by 
other players and therefore can be seen to promote the 
virtue of Socializing Nature. Second, some patterns that 
had been developed in the context of NPCs and AI Agents 
[16] were broadened to incorporate human players. This 
was justified by observing that the patterns worked for 
intentional agents in general, and the broadening mirrored 
the stance taken regarding the applicability of Sicart’s 
virtues although beginning from another starting point. 
Third, many patterns related to several virtues. For 
example, the pattern RISK/REWARD was seen to be related 
to all virtues except Socializing Nature. Fourth, and related 
to the second, some patterns drew players towards the 
mean of one or more virtues while towards the extreme of 
one or more other. For example, INDIVIDUAL REWARDS 
was regarded as promoting Sense of Achievement while 
working against the virtue of Care for Game Balance. 
A second pass through all patterns resulted in the 
identification of more relations between patterns and 
virtues and corrected some initial mistakes or oversights. 
To mitigate the risk that some patterns were missed due to 
subjectivity, a colleague familiar with the pattern collection 
made an external pass of the patterns that had not been 
marked with relations to ensure that this was not the case. 
The third pass focused on those patterns that had relations 
with two or more virtues and were thus deemed more 
relevant for the subject at hand. Two colleagues provided 
external reviews of the examination that lead to some 
revisions, e.g. noting that COMPETITION can counter 
Explorative Curiosity and motivating the revision of  
DIFFICULTY SETTINGS to supporting Sense of Achievements 
since it allows fair challenges against player current skills 
even if completing a game on a harder level than a easer 
one gives a greater achievement.  
After these passes, 161 patterns were found to be related 
with 1 virtue, 131 with 2 virtues, and 50 with 3 virtues. 
ANALYSIS PARALYSIS, CHALLENGING GAMEPLAY, 
DYNAMIC ALLIANCES, EARLY ELIMINATION, GAME 
MASTERS, GRINDING, LATE ARRIVING PLAYERS, and 
PLAYER DECIDED RESULTS, all related to 4 virtues while 
RISK/REWARD related to all virtues but Socializing Nature. 
No patterns were found that had affect on all virtues. At 
first glance this may suggest that the patterns mentioned by 
name above are most relevant to the design of good games, 
but in some cases these patterns supported some virtues 
while pushing others towards extremes. To look at most 
pertinent patterns it is more appropriate to look at those that 
motivate player virtues without necessarily pushing them to 
any extreme. Looking at patterns which support 3 or more 
virtues without pushing towards any extremes gave 24 
patterns, presented in figure 1. 
Patterns # virtues 
RISK/REWARD 5 
DYNAMIC ALLIANCES  4 
GAME MASTERS  4 
PLAYER DECIDED RESULTS  4 
AVATAR PERSONALIZATION  3 
BIDDING  3 
BLUFFING  3 
DIFFICULTY SETTINGS 3 
GAIN INFORMATION  3 
GAIN OWNERSHIP  3 
INTERRUPTABILITY  3 
OPTIONAL RULES  3 
PAPER-ROCK-SCISSORS  3 
PLAYER DECIDED RULE SETUP  3 
SELECTABLE FUNCTIONAL ROLES  3 
SELECTABLE SET OF GOALS 3 
SELECTABLE SOCIAL ROLES  3 
SOCIAL DILEMMAS  3 
SOCIAL INTERACTION  3 
TEAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS  3 
TEAM COMBOS  3 
TEAM STRATEGY IDENTIFICATION  3 
TRADING  3 
VOTING  3 
Figure 1. Patterns supporting most virtues. 
In contrast, figure 2 shows the 7 patterns that that push 
towards the extreme of 3 or more virtues without 
supporting any other.  
Looking at the patterns found in this fashion some 
observations could be made on their similarities regarding 
specific subjects within gameplay or on their relations to 
the virtues. The following describes four such 
observations.   
Observation: The Social Nature of Games 
One striking factor of the examination was that of the 
patterns which promoted most virtues, only 7 of the 24 
found did not support Socializing Nature: DIFFICULTY 
SETTINGS, GAIN INFORMATION, GAIN OWNERSHIP, PAPER-
ROCK-SCISSORS, PLAYER DECIDED RESULTS, SELECTABLE 
SET OF GOALS, and RISK/REWARD. This made it the virtue 
most patterns related to; the second-most related virtue was 
Sense of Achievement that related to all but 9 patterns. That 
one should consider the social nature of games when 
designing them may seem like common sense but is here 
validated by the pattern collection, which was developed 
independently of the player virtues model and with a focus 
on games as systems and on considering computers to be 
possible players of games [5, p. 25]. One reason for this 
may simply be that human interaction is complex in itself, 
and includes conflicts and goals, which makes it suitable to 
build gameplay on. 
Some of these patterns arise quite simply from other 
patterns in multiplayer games, e.g. TEAM 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS and TEAM COMBOS which are team 
versions of ACCOMPLISHMENTS and COMBOS respectively, 
and thereby “gain” a relation in comparison to these other 
patterns. Others, however, add flexibility and thereby 
require interaction where there earlier was no need. For 
example, ALLIANCES can be predetermined and need no 
considerations for long periods of gameplay time while 
DYNAMIC ALLIANCES need to be established and 
maintained (thereby supporting Sense of Achievement), and 
can be used to Care for Game Balance by ganging up on 
runaway leaders. Similarly, SELECTABLE FUNCTIONAL 
ROLES may lead to competition over desirable roles or need 
coordination to identify the needed roles in a given 
situation, something not possible in game with fixed 
ASYMMETRICAL ROLES. 
Observation: Meaningful Play 
Player influence and the importance of meaningful choices 
have been stressed in many descriptions of what forms a 
game. Interestingly, with the exception of RISK/REWARD 
and those patterns that have choices in relation to social 
interaction (e.g. BIDDING, TRADING, PLAYER DECIDED 
RESULTS, and VOTING) this is not clearly mirrored in the 
patterns found. Further, the two patterns most closely 
related to this, EXAGGERATED PERCEPTION OF INFLUENCE 
and FREEDOM OF CHOICE, only related to 2 virtues each. 
Instead, 5 out of the 7 “negative” patterns, and all of the 3 
to have 4 virtue relations, relate to players’ inability to act 
or their choices not being meaningful.   
Besides RISK/REWARD, meaningful play is more strongly 
represented through negative patterns echoes the reasoning 
regarding definitions earlier in the paper. One can judge 
games as bad due to them lacking features, but that which 
makes them good is more difficult to express, at least 
regarding the specific activities they should contain. 
Observation: Player Control over Gameplay 
Another discernable group of patterns relates to how 
players can affect the gameplay of the game – not in the 
sense of players being able to do meaningful choices, but 
rather in the sense of players being able to control the 
gameplay activity from outside the game. DIFFICULTY 
SETTINGS and PLAYER DECIDED RULE SETUP both provide 
players with ways of more precisely calibrating their 
gameplay experience before the games begins. 
SELECTABLE FUNCTIONAL ROLES lets players choose which 
type of gameplay they wish to have within a set of possible 
choices while SELECTABLE SOCIAL ROLES gives players the 
possibility to control how they wish to interact with other 
players. INTERRUPTABILITY makes it possible to stop the 
gameplay activity to do other activities and then resume the 
game when it is suitable. GAME MASTERS provides 
versatility, allowing changes in DIFFICULTY SETTINGS and 
PLAYER DECIDED RULE SETUP during game sessions and 
being able to create roles as needed and handle 
INTERRUPTABILITY on a case by case basis. 
These patterns stress, from the gameplay perspective, the 
importance of acknowledging that gaming is a voluntary 
activity. As such players want to be in control of the factors 
that define the activity as well as when to participate. This 
is also argued by the presence of EARLY ELIMINATION as 
one of the patterns working against most virtues. 
Observation: Two special cases 
The patterns CHALLENGING GAMEPLAY and LATE 
ARRIVING PLAYERS both had 4 relations to Sicart’s virtues 
but supported some virtues while countered others. Since 
they promoted 2 and 3 virtues respectively they are 
arguably still interesting to consider in games but may 
require a better knowledge of the intended audience than 
Patterns # virtues 
ANALYSIS PARALYSIS 4 
EARLY ELIMINATION 4 
GRINDING 4 
EITHER YOU ARE WITH ME OR AGAINST ME 3 
EXCLUDING GROUPS 3 
EXCISE 3 
KING MAKER 3 
Figure 2. Patterns pushing towards virtue extremes. 
the other patterns discussed so far. While CHALLENGING 
GAMEPLAY may fit people wanting to feel the pleasure of 
succeeding in something difficult and not wishing to 
socialize, LATE ARRIVING PLAYERS may instead be 
appropriate for people wishing to casually hang out and 
willing to adjust the gameplay as players turn up. On a side 
note, the two patterns have no overlap in how they relate to 
the virtues, and contradict each other for Socializing 
Nature, Sense of Achievement, and Sportsmanship. This 
may be an indication that they may suit different group of 
players generally.   
DISCUSSION 
The exploration of how to make good games in this paper 
can of course be criticized for having too narrow a view of 
what is important in the design of a game. Monö lists five 
possible views on useful things [21 , p. 17], and this paper 
has only looked at one, that of a game as an implement for 
supporting gaming. The others, ornament, collector’s item, 
merchandise, and product, are also possible aspects. 
Narration as well as the aesthetics of graphics and sounds 
in a game can be added to this list (perhaps fitting within 
the view of a game as an ornament). However, these areas 
have been studied in other disciplines already and the 
design knowledge from these can simply be added to those 
argued for in this paper (although consensus might not 
exist within any these disciplines; so, a choice of what 
school of thought one wishes to work within may be 
necessary). 
From another perspective, Sicart’s virtues are not only 
related to gameplay. For example, Socializing Nature, can 
be achieved through gameplay but social interaction can 
maybe even more likely occur outside the gameplay, and 
the virtue also includes belonging to a culture more 
generally. Looking purely at gameplay for truly single-
player games, i.e. games where no gameplay is relevant to 
any other agent, one could disregard the virtue when 
identifying patterns. After also removing patterns which 
logically need several players (i.e. DYNAMIC ALLIANCES 
and GAME MASTERS), this leaves only 10 patterns out of 
the 24 identified previously, as shown in figures 3 and 4. 
All of these have 3 relations except for RISK/REWARDS 
supports all virtues in this context. 
The use of intentional agents could be seen as making the 
virtues volatile since this use depends on people did 
perceiving NPCs or AI players as other players. This claim 
may be true, and in one sense points to the difficulty of 
creating emotional immersion in interactive narratives. 
However, the same problem exists for online games. Since 
it may be difficult or uninteresting for people to perceive 
anything else about other people in the game besides their 
gameplay actions, these may be perceived and treated as 
NPCs or AI players. Given this, using the concept of 
intentional agents rather than humans may be more suitable 
in general, and also remind game designers of the fragility 
of social conventions in online games. 
The identification of patterns central to many virtues points 
to a starting point for accessing the pattern collection. Since 
these patterns are most closely related to what arguably 
makes a game good they are the most interesting to study 
first, with other patterns becoming relevant based on their 
relation to these or specific design choices related to theme 
or genre. In doing so, the result of examining the patterns 
relations to Sicart’s virtues can provide a solution to the 
problem that becoming familiar with the network of 
patterns in the collection can be daunting due to the sheer 
number of patterns. 
Sicart’s list of player virtues is not necessarily exhaustive. 
Care of Game Balance and Sportsmanship were both 
added after going through Bartle’s player types with the 
motivation “[y]et these are not enough, and there surely 
must be more of them” [26, p. 97] but without giving any 
end criteria for searching. This does not affect the 
applicability of using gameplay design patterns to support 
the design of games. Adding additional virtues would 
maybe highlight other patterns but these would likewise be 
able to support design considerations. For those designers 
that do not agree with the importance of any one of Sicart’s 
virtues, removing that virtue is also possible. As the 
example of removing Socializing Nature showed, the 
relevant patterns change but the approach is not otherwise 
affected. In fact, as long as one can explicitly create a 
framework of player virtues the gameplay design pattern 
collection can be applied to them in the way done in this 
paper. One conclusion of this is that the approach can be 
applied to more narrow views on what characterizes good 
players to point out which gameplay design patterns are 
most relevant. For example, gameplay aesthetic ideals, 
which allow people to “attribute aesthetical value to 





Figure 4. Patterns pushing towards most virtue 
extremes in “true” single-player games. 
Patterns 
DIFFICULTY SETTINGS 
GAIN INFORMATION  
GAIN OWNERSHIP  
PAPER-ROCK-SCISSORS  
PLAYER DECIDED RESULTS 
RISK/REWARD 
SELECTABLE SET OF GOALS 
Figure 3. Patterns supporting most virtues in “true” 
single-player games. 
from inherent qualities of a game artifact” [20], can be used 
as basis for describing player virtues and thereby support 
game designers in making games for target audiences they 
themselves do not belong to. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored how player virtue ethics can be 
used to filter the gameplay design collection to identify 
patterns that aid in designing games that support those 
ethics. By doing so, the paper shows one set of patterns 
important when wishing to create a game with a certain 
view of what constitutes a good game. Even if one does not 
agree with the virtues, the examination method used shows 
a way of grading the pattern collection that can be applied 
from another value basis, including more specific ones 
denoting for example genres. 
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